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THE FEDER.-\L TRAD8.1ARK DILli1l0N ACT: 
POlENT WEAPON OR UPHILL BA TILE 
Erin J. Roth· Georgetown University Law Center 
and 
Roben B. Bennett, Jr." Butkr Uni .... ersity 
INTRODUCTION 
With the enactment of the "Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ,"1 (the "FmA") on 
January 16, 1996, the legal community proclaimed that a new era in U.S. trademark law 
had begun.' Before its enacttnent, U.S. trademark owners were entitled to legal rdief 
W\der the Lanham ACf only if owners couJd prove unauthorized, subsequent use of a 
same or similar mark that " .. as likely confuse the public concerning: the sourt:e of the . 
goods or services in question, or the sponsorship, affiliation or approval by the senior 
mark holder of such junior use.~ Dilution protected a trademark o\\ner directly against 
the diminution of a trademark's commercial value by an unauthorized use of a same or 
substantially similar mark, without the need to prove a likelihood of confusion. With the 
passing of the FTDA. di lution is now federally protected.s However, despite the initial 
scholarly elation at the passage of the FTDA, the Act has proved to be less effective than 
the legal community had initially hoped, The FTDA has been ineffective in completely 
protecting famow marks as was its intent, The reasons include: the absence of a 
definition of ~di l ution." its lack of a reconciliation with the Lanham Act's definition of 
trademarlc protection, the 'weak application of the "famous mark" standards, and the 
improper use of tests to determine the existence of dilution. 
Following a brief discussion of the history of trademark infringement law, the e\'Cllts 
leading to the FTDA, and an overview of the FTDA, this paper discusses the major 
causes or the F'rDA's ineffectiveness, We .... ill then re\iew the application of the act, 
discuss its implications on the future of trademark ownership in business, and suggest 
improvements to the legal application of the act, 
WHAT IS DILUTION? 
The theory of the di lution of trademarks was discussed in a seminal article by Frank 
Schechter in 1921, nearly twenty years before the adoption of the Lanham Act gO\"CrWng 
the registration and protection of trademarks.' While Schechter did nOt expressly use the 
-Firs, Year Law Student, This article had itS origin in an Honor's Thesis prepared for the 
Butler University Honor's Program . 
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tenn "dilution," he did discuss the concept that has become the definition of dilution 
accepted by most scholars today. Schechter proposed to protect trademark o",ners from 
the "whinling away or dispersion of the identifY and,hold upon the public mind of the 
mark ... T Today, this concept has evolved even fwther to embrace protecting a trademark' s 
"commercial magnetism" or selling power against unauthorized use by another party, 
especially in protecting very famous, or weU-known maries.' 
Unlike trademark infringement, dilution does not rely upon the "likelihood of confusion" 
to impose an injunction against a j unior user of a mark. While the concept of dilution 
seems very simple to grasp, applying the theory in practi"t:al situations has proved 
troublesome.9 Much of the difficulty in applyinll the theory has risen out of the natural 
conflict betv,'een the traditional pwpose of trademark law, and the dJ.~ution concept. 
Briefly, dilution, protects a mark nomithstanding the absence of a likelihood of confusion, 
as the mark is seen as property which deserves protection. Dilution confers a property-
like right upon the trademark holder, entitling the holder to maintain the mark against 
uses that, although are not confusing;, rna)' over a period oftime diffuse the po""~r of the 
mark to distinctively identify itself commercially, This cause of action gives the 
trademark: owner an absolute property right in the trademark, and its violation is similar 
to the policy involved in the ton of appropriation. to 
The tort of appropriation is the use of one person's name or likeness by another, without 
pennission and for the benefit of the user, In Carson v. Here:rJohnny Portable Toil~IS,1 1 
a Mich.igan corporation ad\'ertised its rentable toilets as " Here' s Johnny" toilets. Johnny 
Carson, famous latto-night talk show host, brought suit claiming that the Michigan 
corporation had \iolated his right to privacy by publicly appropriating his celebrity $WUS 
for the corpocation's commercial benefil,1l The court ~ld that the use ~r "H~'s 
Johnny" was an appropriation because the phrase was so strongly associated WIlli 
Carson' s public personality. 
In contrast, traditional trademark law protects a manufacturer's trademark from 
competitor's using the same mark on different but competing goods, thereby dishonestly 
profiting for the manufacturer's reputation for quality ll00ds, Infringement is sho .... ll by 
proving a likelihood of consumer COnfusiOlL B Such confusion is shown by the fact that 
the use of an infringing mark is li.k.t:ly to mislead a substantial number of potential 
customers as to the manufacturer of a particular good. I. As trademark infringement 
requires a finding that consumers are being misled, it bas its basis in the tort of fraudulent 
misrepresentation or deceit- IS The trademark holder may. only protect. the .trademz:rt 
when such protection is beneficial to conswners by enabling them to Idenufy quality 
goods or services from an infringing mark of!mo."er quality. Therefore, a trademark holder 
or o\WCr holds only a limited right in his mark. He may only protect his mark when 
such protection is beneficial to an individua1 relying on the conect recognition of his 
mark.. He cannot protect the mark. itself. simply to maintain its own value to the owner, 
Jior example.Jn Vuitlon et Fils, $.A. Y. CrOl+71 Handbags,16 the court granted Vuitton, a 
manufacturer ofluxuty handbags, pennanent injunctive relief from Cro\VJl Handbag's lISle 
of a mark similar to that which Vuitton used on its handbags, Vuinon et Fils is a 
manufacturer of high quality handbags bearing the Vuitton registered trademark, the fum's 
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~ni~a~ and a "f1eur-~e-lis. ~ Cro"'ll handbags was not a Vuinon retail ourlel, but sold 
tmltatlonS of the Vwnon hand.~, . A~ the trial, the imitation Crown handbags were 
sh~\Vfl ~ be cheap, !ow qual ity lIIlltatlons of Vuitlon's product. Such use \'iolated 
Vwnon s trademark nghts, Judge Brieant stated: 
When an alleged infringing mark is used in connection with the sale of similar 
~OOds. the long standing rule .. .has been, thai the second comer 10 the marketplace 
has a duty to so name and dress hIS product as to a\'oid all likelihood of 
consumers confusing it with the product of the first comer ' ~ 1l 
S imil~IY,. all trade~~ infringement cases ~Iy upon the likelihood' of confusion to prove 
that a JUDJor mark Infiinges upon the distinct nature of the senior mack. 
To~y, .dilution theory has further evolved, Current dilution theory recognizes the theory 
of dil,ut,on ~ presented by Schechter. embracing the notion that dilution protects a mark 
norwl1hstand~ the absence of ,a. l.ikeli hood of confusion. Howcver, this theory has 
broadened to Include mas not Imtlally recognized as a part of dilution bv Schechter, 
~~~r, CUJTent c~ on di~u~o~ have distinguished two distinct types of dilution cases: dilutl~n by' blumnll and ddutl~n ~y tamishment.~ ~Di1ution by blurring" is defined 
as the connnuous use of a mark sunilar to a plaintiff's mark that wories an adverse effeci 
upon the di.stinctive~ss of ~ p~~£rs mark whereby, if the plaintiff is unable to stop 
slI7h use, hiS mark W1~ I~e ~ts dlstmctive quality entirely. nil "Dilution by tantishment" 
stnves to prevent the dUDJnubon of the posith'C associations a holder has labored to create 
through his advertising and promotion. The tamishrnent theory holds the notion that a 
trademark represents the reputation and goodwill of the holder and any unauthorized use 
of ~e mark, make that reputation and goodwill susceptibl~ to inj~, Dilution by 
t~shment IS considered to OCCur in 1:\1.'0 ways: (I) the unauthorized junior use of a 
~~or holder's mark on goods or services of inferior quality and (2) by the unauthorized 
Juntor use of a senior bolder 's mark in an Wlwholesome context1t 
~ilu~11 received very li ttle attention Wltil 1933 when the dilution theory first appeared 
m a New York court. In the ~ of Tiffany & CO. Y. Tiffany Produclions, 1'J the New 
Yor~ Supreme C~un granted re.lief to the famous Tiffany jewelers against the defendant 
mo~~ theal~r which used the Tiffany name in association with adul t entertainment The 
plaintiff claimed that suc:b use would diminish and tarnish the reputation of Tiffany & 
C~ .• a fB:mous, m~dlser of ~nsive jewelry. Atthough the court found that there 
~sted little I~~I~ of confuslon, since the two parties "'"ere not competing services, 
n granted the lD,junctlon to protect the reputation of the jeweler,21 The coun considered 
the matter under New York inhingement law because a'dilution statute did not then exist 
under ~ew YO,rk law. Ho~ever, the court used dilution tenninolog:y, instead of the 
confusion temunology associated "'ith trademark infringement, to justify its decision. 
Once again, ho .... ~\'C~, little was heard concerning trademark di lution until 1946. General 
fear.of.monopoh.zauo~ oftradem~, and the misunderstandinll and misinterpretation 
of diluuon theory kept II from becommg a provision in the original version of the Lanham 
AC1 ,21 Ho .... 'Cver. the follo",ing year, the first state anti-dilution measure was passed in 
Massa~h~~.21 Subsequently, other concerns surrounding the power and scope of a 
potential dduuon statute kept it from becoming pan of federal legislation until J995 ,l. 
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While the f~dcral govcmm~nt was reluctant to adopt the dilution theory, over half of the 
states adopted di lution stannes or included dilution theory in their common laW.2' The 
International Trademark Association OT A) even urged states to adopt a model trademark 
dilution bill.~ Most state 18 .... '$ foll ow the ITA model and provide injunctive relief on a 
finding of likelihood of dilution. However, Wltil th~ late 19705, courts were reluctant to 
apply dilution principles despite their authori ty to do so from their respective 
legislarurcs-21 
In 19n, the New York Court of Appeals brought dilution into the mainstream of 
trademark protection in Allied Maimenanc.e Corp. v. Allied"Mecnanical Tradel, Inc.lI 
Although the court in Allied Maintenance did not find dilution, it provided a judicial 
definition of dilution that was consistent willi. Schechter's original analys1\. The decision 
stated that dilution 'was not confusion, as was the case with trademark infringement. It 
was, instead. a "cancer-like gro .... 1h of dissimilar products or services which feed upon the 
business reputation of an established distinctive trademark "19 Because Allied was not a 
distinct mark, the court found no di lution. It stated that this case "erected one of the most 
fonnidable barriers to dilution relief: the requirement that the plaintiffs mark be 
somehow famous. .. )0 Thus, the court limited such dilution protection to those marks that 
were sufficiently distinctive. 
Despite its impact, the Allied Maintenance case did not prove to be the catalyst for a 
boom in dilution case filings as some had expected. ll In dilution cases reported in 
Federal Courts since 1917, only forty-three considered dilution as more than a boilerplate 
issue . Only ten cases resulted in an injunction based on dilution in part, while only four 
cases based their entire rationale on dilution.32 The Restatement on Unfair Competition 
reiterates the view that while courts were reluctant to utilize the: dilution rationale before 
Allied MainfeMllce, there had been a general acceptance of the theory in the years since 
even though its application by legal commWlity bad been sparse. However, the 
Restatement cautions that courts continue to confine the cause of action for di lution to 
cases in which die protectable interest is clear.» Courts were more willing to use dilution 
as a complement to traditional trademark cases than to create a broad di lution cause of 
action. 
As a result, state remedies, and the willingness of each court system to issue injunctive 
relief, varied. encoutaging forum shopping.)! Ironically, under all relevant state law, the 
tv.'O essential elements of a trademark dilution claim are the same: the senior holder must 
possess a distinctive trademark, and there must be a likelihood of dilution.:» Most states 
that had adopted the di lution doctrine are in agreement on tv.'o crucial points, at least in 
theory: trademarlc dilution can occur regardless of the lack of a likelihood of confusion 
and despite the absence of competition between parties.loII 
Yet, even in sean:hing for the most favorable outcome, plaintiffs were often swprised at 
the difficulty they faced in obtaining a ~y, Only half of the states had dilution laws 
bv 1995' therefore many sWC courts were hesitant to grant a nation .... ide injunction as 
if remed~ .. as-nati~al enforcement of the injunction seemed impossible.J• Holders of 
famous marks increasingly pushed for national dilution protection hoping to gain national 
protection for their marks. The Assistant Generai Counst:1 for Campbell Soup Company, 
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in suppan of federa l trademark protection stated: 
When the rights which we try to enforce arc not clearly stated, we must 
either commit ourselves to expensive, protracted and uncertain litigation 
or fail to act in defense of our brands. Such cases represent a financial 
loss for the trademark owner and a loss of efficiency for the judicial 
system "'ruch could be remedied by legislative adoption of dilution as a 
basis for the protection of famous trademarks. ;1 
Increasing recogni tion of and support for a dilution provision at a national level, spWTed 
the owners of famous trademarks to push for a di lution debate outside the academic arena. 
With growing restlessness for greater national protection than that which the Lanham Act 
offered: the federal gO\'CnUDC1lt began to take serious action towards nationalizing dilution 
protectlon. 
H1STOR Y OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT LAW 
\\!hen ~he Lanham Act was adopted in 1946, providing fo r the federal registration and 
protectIon of trademarks, no state had previously adopted trademarlc laws. While the idea 
of trademarks, as well as dilution, had been around in academic circ les for some nwnber 
of )'ears, the economic fear of mooopolies had delayed the adoption of the Lanham Act 
or similar trademark protection legislation.lII The Senate committee on Patents in 
recommending the passage of the Lanham Act. assured Senate that it would not "fo:mr 
hateful monopolies.'>«1 The major apprehension lay in the belief that a trademark would 
allow one producer to essentially comer a product market. U After the holder's mark 
became synonymous with the product, one could raise market entl}' barriers preventing 
additional competition for that product 4) It was largely because of this overwhclrning 
fear of monopoly that the Lanham Act was ",ritten as it was, initially ignoring the idea 
of dilution. 
From the outset, the Act sought to protect the public from deceit and swindling. It also 
sought to promote fair 'Competition. OJ These goals W'Cl'C consistent with the roolS of 
tra~mark law in fraud and deceit. Likewise, these goals addressed the monopolistic fears 
vOiced by opponentS of the Lanham Act" Trademark law, therefore, did not evolve as 
the protector of an ownership interest in a mark. Instead, its aim was to establish a real 
relationship between the tradmaarlc and the ttademark holder. 
The baLance of the above mentioned goals 'WaS addressed in the language of the Lanham 
Act which required the proof of the likelihood of confusion. As it was designed, the 
Lanham Act protected a trademarlc holder against unauthorized, subsequent use of the 
same or similar mark that was likely to result in public confusion concerning the source 
of ~e goods or services in question, or the sponsorship, affiJiation or approval by the 
~o~ m~ bolder to such junior usc.4J The likelihood of confusion requirement placed 
a limltatlon on the trademark holder and the exclusive right to use the mark. Before 
~~ising the excl~vity of one '.s mark, o~ would have to demonsuate that, through a 
likelihood of CO~IOn, the public was bemg harmed. &6 Therefore, the exclusive right, 
or the monopoly nght, could only be exercised when it was in the interest of the public 
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to prevent fraud and deceit. This limitation furthered the current and historical g~ls of 
trademark regulatIOn while counterbalancing fears about the condlltt of monopolies. 
Howe\'er, dilution statues do not require likelihood of confusion. The harm that th~ 
dilution statutes seek to prevent are not harms to the public, but ramer, harms to the 
trademark bolder because the distinctive quality of the mark is impaired. Clearly, then, 
the principles underl)ing the state dilution statutes seem to diverge from the intent of the 
Congress when it enacted the Lanham Act.~1 In light of this divergence from trademark 
law, ",'hy would Congress enact a federal dilution statute as an amendment to the Lanham 
Act? • 
There exists another Congressional purpose lhat academic circles and at Teast one district 
court have found persuasive.~ J Arguably, Congress intended to ~eve national 
Wlifonnity in trademark la",'5 via the Lanham Act. 49 The Senate Comrruttee. on Patents 
suggested that one of the attractions of a federal trademark statute was that If the stales 
.... '()Uld change the law with respect to trademarks, that there would be "as many different 
varieties of common law as there are states."'" Citing gro .... th in interstate trade, the 
Committee on Patents stated that it would be unwise for trademark rights to vary from 
state to state.'1 The Committee urged that national registration was needed to "secure to 
the owners of trademarks in interstate commerce defInite rights ." ~ 
Section 45 of the Lanham Act supports the uniformity argwnent which supports the 
notion of federal protection of marks. Over the seven and a half years ~ the ~ct "':as 
debated, few issues were debated more often than the inclusion of a natlonai ~omllty 
clause. Congress expressed the goal ..... to protect registered trademarks used m such 
(interstate) commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation."" EventualJy, 
this Statement was included, suggesting the overwhelming intent of the Act to encourage 
federal, not slate, regulation of tradema.rks. 
From the 1946 legislative history, it is easy to demonstrate an inconsistency between ~c 
Congressional intention behind the Lanham Act which focused on c.onsumer protecnon 
and the intent of state dilution statutes which focused on protectlon of the o",ne~, 
investment in the mark. However, the legislath'e history of the Act does not end m 
1946,'"' In 1988, Congress passed the Trademark Revision Act.31 \VhiIe the Trademark 
Re\i sion Act, itself, is of little interest when discussing trademark dilution starute:s, the 
legislative history illustrates the shift in emphasis from exclusiye conswner protectIon to 
include protection of the mark holder since the passage of the Lanham Act. 
Although, the Senate approved an anti-dilution pro\-;si~n within ~e ~ rademark Revuioo 
Act. which would provide a federal cause of action for dilutIOn, ~e Ho~ of 
Representatives struck that provision. ~ The Senate report that accomparued the bill to 
the House stated that the federal antidilution provision had the narrow pwpose of 
protecting truly famous registered tradema.rks.n The anti-diluti~ provisio.n made clear 
pt i ts~ pe~k was not the likelihood of confusion, decepn?", or ~stake by ~ 
pUblic.JI Instead, the statute protects the trademark's owner. ~amst actl~ by a ~ 
party that "destroy the public'S perception that the mark SIgnifies something ~que, 
singular or particular.''" The accompanying Senate report goes on to state thai lIlStud 
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of intending to protect the public, it "focuses on the investment the owner has made in 
the mark.'o6O 
'f!1e ~port also acknowledged the inconsistency among the states in the area of tmdemark 
diluhon. The federal provision was lntended to "establish a nationwide floor for 
~ot~ction against di lution.»61 The Senate report noted that although many stales had 
diluaon statutes, the court decisions interpreting these statues were inconsistent and 
therefore, "combined with the n~er of states that [did] not have di lution laws, (created] 
a patc~r~.type o~ ~tection. The Senate report further noted that passage of a 
fede:aJ dilUtlo~ proVIsion would help the United States in the negotiations conceming the 
foreIgn prot~tlon of U.S. trademarks abroad as part afme General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Tr:ade (GATT) process, 8S many "GATT nations" already possessed dilution 
protectIOn. 6.l 
~urther, the bill was not intended to ~mpt state regulation to the extent that, at that 
tun~ , such provisions provided greater protection than did the federal starute.64 It was 
deSIgned, like the original Lanham Act, to provide a nationwide minimum level of 
dilution protection. 
When the bill was introduced into the House, however, it "''as met \~;th Constitutional 
concerns related to the First Amendment." The concerns dealt with the freedom of 
com~tive speech and parody and this provision's possible effects upon the continued 
protecnon of these two types of speech. Concerns that this provision would, in effect, 
make such fonns of speech virtually illegal, led to the removal of the antidilution 
pro\-ision from the bill that would eventually become the Trademark Revision Act.66 
The legislatiye histOry surrounding the Trademark Revision Act laid the groundwork for 
future attempts at the adoption of federal anti·dilution measures. Both houses of Congress 
DOW spoke approvingly of the protection of the trademark holder's interest in the mark. 61 
The shift from a limited right to an absolute right in the mark reflects Schechter's thesis' 
the m:u-k. itself, is something to be protected for its own value. Given the apparen~ 
lesserung of the concern over monopolization, and the new intent of the legislation to 
protect the trademark bolder's investment, the likelihood of confusion test became 
superlluous. 
J?le .new intent of the dilution doctrine involved providing a federal foundation of a 
dilutlon law upon which the states could build greater protections. This new intent, 
combined with the diminishment of both the fear of monopolies and the lack of need for 
the likelihood of confusion standard, laid the ground work for the next significant attempt: 
at establishing a federal dilution statute, The FedenrJ Trademark: Dilution Act of 1995. 
THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DlLlJTION ACT OF 1995 
Follo .... ing the failure to include a dilution provision within the 1988 Trademark: Revision 
~ct, .mark holders continued to rely on developing state law to protect against trademark 
diluaon. HO"''ever, the variety of problems associated with state dilution la",'5 were once 
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again brought to the forefront. Most notable among the many problems was the difficulty 
of obtaining a remedy. 1be onl)' remedy available under most State laws was an 
injunction preventing the use afthe diluting mark.6I However, as previously mentioned, 
some state courts were reluctant to gram national injunctions for • .. iolation of state dilution 
iav.'S because of the difficulty of enforcement. Consequently, the scope of an injunction 
became a primary issue in the debate over federal dilution protection. If an injunction 
was ismed oniy for the jurisdiction granting the injunction, the unauthorized use of the 
mark could continue in any other state, evenrually spilling over into the jurisdiction in 
.... tuch the injunClion was originally granted. Con\'crsely, if. nationv.ide injunction "'"8S 
granted, the legal basis for applying the injunction in state'! without dilution laws was 
sus~ct. &9 As time w~nt on, it became incrcas~n~ly ~pa!ent that ~s ~tch\\ .. ork system 
of dilution law .... 'as madequate 10 protect dlStmctlve marks which '"'Were, almost by 
definition., nationally recognized and required a nationwide injunction. 
Second, many state dilution statutes struggled to define the varying degrees of made 
disrincth'COCss. Courts Struggled to draw a line beN,een those marks distinctive enough 
to be diluted and those marks that were nol so distincti .... e. The problem with dilution in 
this respect is that the dilution concept was a prediction of the effects of impairment 
resulting from a secondary use over time, making the future value of a mark to holders 
almost impossible to quantify.1O 
Third, anti..cJilution la","'5 were often susceptible to improper judicial application.. in most 
cases, dilution as a state claim was pleaded as a boilerplate supplement to the Lanham 
Act trademark infringement claims. 7L Consequently, many rulings on dilution were by 
Federal Courts applying a state's law based on pendant jurisdiction. 71 These results led 
to questionable precedemi.al value of any dilution rationale at all. Many courts implied 
a confusion standard similar to traditional trademark law in order to find dilution. 13 
These major problems with state anti-dilution statutes arc best demonstrated in Mead Dolo 
Central. Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales. US.A. Inc.?' Mead, the provider of LEXJS legal 
research services, brought a suit 10 enjoin Toyota Motor Sales from marketing a luxury 
automobile using the name LEXUS.7J Utilizing the New York ant i-dilution statute, Mead 
claimed that the name LEXUS would dilute the LEXIS mark for legal services." The 
lrial coun held that the name LEXUS was likely to dilute the LEXlS mark. without 
finding a likelihood of confusion." The Second Circuit reyersed the decision, ho ..... evtr. 
stating that the LEXIS mark was not likely to be diluted because it was only recognizable 
and distinctive to the legal community, not the general public." The court of appeals 
.stated that the senior mark needed to be distinctive to the general public to qualify fOT 
dilution protection.1'9 
In the Mead DaJa case, the trial courtS granted the plaintiffs a nationwide injtmCtion based 
on New York's dilution statute.1Il Enjoining the LEXUS mark on any basis other less 
than a national one would hayc rendered the injunction virtually useless. However, a 
state dilution statute could not provide a sufficiently strong legal basis to support a 
- nationWiaeinjunction.'L If a natiom .. ide injunction had been upheld using New York's 
law, Toyota Motor Sales would have been penalized for engaging in an activity that was 
legal in half of the United States. Also, because of the inconsistency of the judicial 
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application of dilution statutes, Mead Data might not ha\'e been upheld in the remaining 
states which did have dilution lav..'S.1l Still another argument against imposing state 
injunctions on a national basis coocems the constitutionality of extraterritorial 
injunctions.
'
) 
Mead Data also accentuated the problems with the varying definitions of distinctiveness. 
In Mead Data, both the trial conn and the conn of appeals relied on the Nev.' York 
dilution statue language to determine whether the LEXIS mark was distinctive, but their 
analyses relUlted in two different decisions. Holding that the LEXlS mark was 
distinctive, the trial court detennined that the proper test for distinctiveness was ''whether 
the malk [could] distinguish its product from others and [was] uniquely associated .... ith 
the source of the product.'014 The Court of Appeals considered other factors in arriving 
at its decision that the LEXIS mark was not distinctive: (I) The strength of the mark and, 
(2) whether the mark had a distinctive quality to the general public.1S The Mead Data 
cases reflected the Mdichotomy [that developed) between those courts stressing and those . 
deprecating strong distinctiveness as a sine qua non for protectability against dilution. ~Ifi 
Some courts emphasized the mark's uruqueness, arbitrariness, fame and celebrity while 
others supported the position that if a mark serves as an identifier and, in fact, identifies 
a product to consumers, it is distinctive enough to qualify for protection from dilutiOn..' 1 
Further, courts have found a variety of marks to be "distinctive ;~ whi le some of the 
marks determined 10 be ~distinctive" are natwnally known," many others are not." 
Analyzing decisions such as Mead Data also accentuates problems associated with the 
improper judicial application of the di lution definition within and between state courts. 
F?r instance, the Second Circuit in Mead Dato considered whether the avemge consumer 
v..:ould find .LEXIS and LEXUS confusingly similar, though dilution theory expressly 
dl~s.ukelihood of confusion in its analysis. 90 The federal court, applying the New 
York dilution statute, stated that prior Nev.' York decisions that granted reliefin a dilution 
claim required a finding of "confusion, fraud, lor] deception:"1 Thus, this coun felt that 
a likelihood of confusion should be a factor in dilution analysis, even though a likelihood 
of confusion is not expressly required by the New York statute.v.! Fwther, even though 
the New York. and Riinois dilution statues are identical, decisions in their respective 
courts often differed suhstantially.9J For example, Illinois courts often refused to find 
dilution if no confusion existed, while New York courts often found dilulion only in the 
presence of confusion.!I< 
F~er, while not expressly discussed in Mead Dala, the issue of the application of 
dilutIOn statutes to non-competing goods has been disputed by the COutts and scholars . 
Scholan ~ve argued whether the definition of "dilution" includes a need for parties to 
be .com~tors .. Sc~lars have noted that "there is. .. nothing in the statutes which suggest 
or Implies that dilunon should be limited to._where the parties 8rC_.related-..the Statutory 
language strongly implies that the proximity between the parties' goods or services is 
irrelevant to a finding of dilution.~ HO","'C\'er, the New York court interpreted New 
York's dilution statute as requiring the plaintiff and defendant to be in related 
businesses," even though the New York starute expressly states that dilution can be found 
even in the absence of competition between the panics." Finally, state courts had also 
inteTpreted the definition of "di lution" to include the necessity for wrongful intent on the 
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part of the defendant, despite the lack a wrongful intent requirement in any state dilution 
stalute." 
As a result of such state inconsistencies, Rep. Carlos Morehead (R-Ca.) introduced the 
FTDA before the House of Rc:presenlalives in March, 1995.911 Backed strongly by the 
International Trademark Association (INTA), the .<\merican Bar Association (ABA), the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the United Sates Trademark Association 
(UST A) and bipartisan support, this federal dilution proposal was approved 100 The House 
passed the FTDA on December 12, 1995 and the Senate did the same on December 29, 
1995.1G1 On January 16, 1996, President Clinton signed thelfTDA1«! into law.l); 
The FTDA is similar 10 the dilution provision the USTA attempted 10 incftlde in the 19811 
Trademark Revision Act. Like the USTA provision, the purpose of the FTDA is to 
"protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blm the distinctiveness of the JIUIJ'k 
or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. ,,1(10 It attemptS 
to accomplish this purpose by adding an amendment to the Lanham Act allowing legal 
action to be taken when the unauthorized use of a famous mark "causes di lution to the 
distinctive qualiry of the mark-nlln n.e federal statute was deemed "necessary becaUSt 
famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is 
currently oniy available on a patch--quilt system of protection. ,,106 Tbe House report on 
the proposed bill abo stated that the federal remedy would "bring I.mjJormity and 
consistencY to the protection offamous marks," I07 lessening fOTUIra.shopping and reducing 
litigation ~sary to proteCt famous marks. le• Testifying before the House Comminte 
on the Judiciary in further support of the FTDA, the Assistant General Counsel for 
Campbell Soup Company stated that the "damage to the Campbell Soup Company's 
trademarks as a result of dilution 'is at the heart of our endorsement of dilution 
legislation.'''IOf 
A fwtber goal of the FTDA was to be consistent with the international treaties in "'ruch 
the United States had previously engaged in the trademark areaYo According to the 
House Report, a portion of the agreement during the "Uruguay Round of the GAIT 
agreement include[d] a provision designed to provide dilution protection to famous 
marks. nit 1 Therefore, IUl impetus for the passage of the FmA was the urgency in 
complying with the terms of the agreement. Legislators furt:her asswned that the "passage 
of a federal dilution statute would ... assist the executive branch in. .. negotiations with other 
countries to secure greater protection for the famous maJks owned by U.S. companies.,,112 
Rep. Carlos Morehead reiterated.. however that "foreign countries ['WOuld be] reluctant to 
change their laws to protect famous U.S. marks if the United States, itself, (did not] 
afford special protection for such marks. "Ill 
Similar to the 1988 version, the FTOA defines dilution as the "lessening of the capacity 
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or servicu, regardless of the presente 
or absence of (I) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties., 
or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. " 11~ Although this definition is very 
sfmilarto"thC"dilution by bluning" definition in the 1988 dilution provision, the FIDA's 
legislative history dearly indicates that it protects against both dilution by blurring and 
tamishmentY' The legislative history also reveals that the FTDA's intended scope is to 
10 
protect against dilution caused by the unauthorized use of a famous mm on competitive 
as well as non-competitive goods. lie TIlt FIDA also makes it clear that likelihood of 
confusion is nOI necessary as a factor in dilution analySis. 
The FTDA limits a claimant's remedies to injunctive relief "unless the person against 
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or 10 
cause dilution of the famous mark."117 It enumerates several factors determinative of 
wbether a mark is "dislinctive and famous." III The FTDA's intent was to provide a 
federally enforceable injunction as the main remedy for a successful dilution suil 
However. it also provided for the awarding of damages in instances of willful intent.119 
In addition, the owner of the famous mark is entitled to any profits, and costs up to the 
treble amounts as well as the destruction of any offending articles. llo It also makes 
federal trademark registration a "complete bar" to a state di lution action, though il does 
DOt preempt any state dilution laW.121 
The FTDA's one notable improvement over any earlier federal dilution proposal is its 
attempt to address First Amendment concerns raised by critics of the dilution doctrine. 
The Act precludes a federal dilution cause of action against the "fair use of a famous 
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify 
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark."I22 It also renders 
non-actionable the non-commercial use of a mark as well as its use in news reponing and 
commentary. III 
The fTDA, while seemingly straightforward in its approach to di lution law, only solves 
some of the problems encountered by the Slate dilution laws. In the next sections the 
strengths and weaknesses of the FTDA will be examined. 
STRENGTHS OF THE FEDERAL TRADL"lARK DILUTION ACT OF 1 995 
lbe two main strengths of the FTDA lay within its legislative intent to solve the problems 
associated .... ith the previous "patchwork" of stale dilution la ..... "5. By definition, a victim 
of di lution, under the FTDA, should be able to nationally enforce an injunction against 
the diluting use of the mark. Enforcing an injunction from state to state will DO longer 
be scrutinized, thus making a dilution claim and injunction more nationally uniform. as 
intended. 
Second, it should provide for a measure of consistency in the application of dilulion 
principles. Instead of federal courts applying state laws, the FTDA allows federal courts 
to apply federal law. The federal cowts should be able to establish precedents based 
upon the measmes prescribed in the FTI>A. 
As a sidebar, the FTDA also notes that non--commercial, critical, and comparative 
advertising uses of a famous mark are not subject to dilution law. These exceptions 
should allow this Act survive First Amendment challtnge. 
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WEAKNESSES OF THE FEDERAL TRAD£h.{ARK DlLUTIO}: ACT OF 1995 
Wbil~ the fTDA bas improved upon the state dilution statul~S, its lack of anention to a 
few impon8nt matters has left federal courts searching for e. ~fonn in~erp~ta~on and 
application of dilution and the statute. In e~nce. the F"T?A IS no~ servlllg Its IlIte~ed 
legislative purpose to date, due to the followmg shortconungs: an l~uate definition 
of "dilution ,. its lack of a reconciliation with the Lanham Act's definiUon of trademark 
protection, tbev.-eak application ofth~ "famous m~"~, the improper use of tests 
to determine the existence of dilution, and the policy decISion not 10 preempt state laws. 
• 
Lack of II. Workable Dilution Defmition 
First, the definition of dilution provided by the FTDA gives no additional insight into ~ 
problems of the state statutes in defining dilution.1:!of ~'Di1utio~" ~s 50 broadly defi~d tn 
the FTDA that any lessening of value could be considered di lution, and thus 5UbJect to 
injunction.llS 
The lack of clarification, leaves trademark dilution open to ownership and monopolization 
debates. The broad terminology used comes very close to providing the o~r of a 
famous mark a monopoly on the mark itself, as well as almost anything resembling the 
made 
Proponents offederal trademark di lution action argue that a trademark can be "ov-ned."ll1i 
In fact, the FIDA, itself. ref~rs to a trademark bolder as an owner of the mark. Ul 
H"owever, based upon case law, others argue that a trademark "oVvller" does n~t ~ly O":ll 
his trademark instead, he has a limited right in his trademark. "Ownership' us~d m 
connection ""ith trademarks is merely a figure of spee<:b to delineate the bolder of 
different marks.l2.1 Becaus~, some argue a trad~mark is incapable of being "owned," there 
can be no treSpass by an illicit user of a mark, just as an individual cannot sue for 
trespass of real property if he does not ovm that property.)lt 
One of the strongest opponents of trademark dilution protection, Geo~e . ~ddl~n, 
argues that in order to grant statutory rights to a ~e~ark holder to ~J~m a ~rd 
party's dilution of the mark essentially creates a copynght tn the trad~k. Granttn8 
a copyright of the mark, he argues, would be essentially the same as gIVIng the trademark 
bolder a monopoly on the m.aJk as used in any context. 
Lack of an Express Re<:onciliation with th~ Lanham Act 
The property-like right debatably conferred upon tra~emarks is ~ direct confl i ~t ~th 
trademark law I\S delineated in the Lanham Act. As discussed preViously, the legJslatJ.\"e 
. tent since the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 has seemingly changed from ilS 
sole purrx;s-;to aid the consumer by easy identification of product quality, to additionally 
aiding the consumer in identifying a mark in the marketplace. H?wever, the F!DA does 
nothing to reconcile the two differing viev.points. In fact, It seems to Ignore the 
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dichotomy between exclusive conswner protection, as stated in the original text of the 
Lanham AC~ and the inclusion of trademark owner protection in the FTDA altogether. 
Abo. theu: IS no guarantee that, even with the new dilution definition and the seven 
f~c~rs defining "famous," courts will do a bener job, in the long-run, at defining "true" 
d~utl~n ~m s~pposed dilution. Without express resolution of the dichotomy , the 
~~e~ng V1ewpo~1S OIl ~ JX)tential property-rights due to 8 trademark are left up to 
ll'ldlVldual court tnt~retanon. 1be current lack of unifonnity by the courts in applying 
those standards which are expressly delineated in the FTDA does not bode well for the 
uniform interpretation of the implied reconciliation of the dichotomous viev.-points of the 
FTIJA and the Lanham Act. Without Wlifonn application of botil express and implied 
standards of the fTDA, legal claimants are left without consistent precedents. 
Weak "Famous Mark" Standards 
T?e. fi~t criticism concerning the "famous mark" standards presupposes that the level of 
dl stl:n~tlveness required for dilution protection sbould be the same as that required for 
IraditlOnal trademark protettion.1l1 Under such an interpretation, virtually all trademarks 
would be subject to dilution protection. Courts have been unable to come to agreement 
on the definition of "fame," either before or after the passage of the FTDA III Mead 
~ta held that before dilution prolcction would apply, a plaintiff must prove that its mark 
IS not only strong, but famous among the general public, as .... 'CII. Jn If the defendant's 
market is nationwide, then the plaintiff's mark must also be nationally famous. 
Consequently, under Mead Dora, the fact that a plaintiffs mark is well kno .... n in a 
narrow product market would not be sufficient to trigger dilution protection.l3<1 
Howevet',.since Mead Data, courts have i nt~rpretcd distinc·tivencss differently. Either the 
COurts relted ~n the Mead Dala concurring opiruOIl which stated that strong, local 
marks ~r marks In a Mp'OW product area could qualify for dilutiorr protection1Ji1 or courts 
had relOterpreted the majority opinion in Mead Data to mean that distinctiveness for 
dilution puzposes, is the same as distinctiveness for tradcmark infringement purpoS~s.I16 
Other circuits defined "famous" or "distiru::ti\"e" in yet other manners. m "The FOT A was 
supposed to rem~y this incongruence between circuits, but has, instead, added a new 
problem concermng "famous marks." The FTDA lists eight factors which are to be 
considered in deciding upon the "fame" of a mark. The FroA's eight "famous factors" 
~st closely res:emble th~ Second Circuit's majority deftnition of a famous mark, thus 
uruformly applytng that definition at the federal leveL Tht eight "famous factors" are as 
fo llo;'5: ( I) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark, (2) the 
d~1ion and ~t oftbe use of the mark in connection ..... ith the goods or services with 
which the mark IS used, (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicitv of the 
mark, (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in whicb the mark is used: (5) the 
channels of trad~ for the goods 01" services ..... ith which the owner's mark is used, (6) the 
degree of recognition of the marlc: in trading areas and chanllels of trade used by the 
mark's OVt'llet' and the person against whom the injtmction is sought, (7) the nature and 
ext~nt of use of the same or similar mark by third parties, and (8) whether the marl:: was 
registered under the Act of March 3, J 881 , or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the 
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principal register. III 
Since the enactment of the FTDA, some thirty-five reponed cases have diJectly discussed 
dUution.I:;9 "While some cases have protected the o,""ner.> of " famous marks" based upon 
the factors delineated in the FTOA and based upon the majority opinion in Mead Dara, 
other.> have left questions concerning this definition of '"famous." For instance, in 
Ringling Bros. "1'. Urah Division o/Travel DePf.,'''' the U.s. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held that the FTDA protects the holders of famous roarlcs against the 
unauthorized use of marks that imitale, but are not identical.lo, the famous mark because 
such use blun the famous mark' s distinctiveness. Even tM\J.gh Ringling Bros. had used 
the bademark "The Greatest Show on Earth" in connection v.ith its cireus shows for many 
years, the state of Utah was not enjoined from using a similar slogan "'he Greatest Snow 
on Earth" to promote its skiing indUstry. I. 1 Utah's slogan was not considered to appeal 
10 a market large enough to v.'8mlIl1 " fiunous" treatment 
Conversely, "famous" has been applied to parties who are not well known. In Inrermatic, 
Inc. v. Toeppenl<2 and Panavis/on International L.P. v. Toeppen, both Inlermatic, Inc. and 
Panavision International L.P." l were described as ' 'famous marks" and, thus, were given 
di lution prOlection. l ... Granting ' 'famous'' stams to these marks seems inappropriate when 
testing these marks against the "famous" factors in the FTDA, the majority decision in 
Mead Dala,lf! and the majority decision in Ringling BroS.IM An injunction was not 
granted to the plaintiff in Ringling Bros. because ODe of the two patties involved was 
deemed to not have marks famous enough 10 be recognized in connection with the goods 
or services they represented. However, plaintiffs in both the Toeppen cases were granted 
an injunction despite the obvious lack of fame of at least one of the parties io\-olved in 
each case. According to the factors in the FTDA and the majority decision in both Mead 
Data and Ringling Bros., a famous mark must be famous among the general public. If; 
for instance, a plaintiff's mad is only well-known within a narrow product market, then 
it arguably is not afforded dilution proteCtion as a famous mark.l"*7 Practitioners have 
argued that neither Intermatic, Inc. or Pana.vision International L.P. could be considered 
"famous" under the FTDA.I.I 
Similarly, in a case settled out of court in January of 1997, Coca-Cola settled .... ith 
Babson Bros. Co., an Illinois distributor of dairy and agricultural equipment, for an 
undisclosed amount. Coca-Cola was attempting to marut a new soda, Surge, as part of 
a $50 million advertising campaign during the Super Bowl. Based upon cases like 
Toeppen. however, Coca-Cola settled fearing that Babson' Bros. Co. might prevail in • 
dilution action as they had been using the name Surge on its products for decades, even 
though its stams as a "famous" mark might be questionable . l~ 
Improper Use of Tests to Oetennine the Existence of Dilution 
_ One,oft!!.~st significanl barriers, to date. to a finding of liabili ty in ~veral ~s ~der 
the FfDA bas been the requirement of proving dilution. Although 10 some SlruatlOns, 
relief under the FTOA bas been easy to obtain, many trademark owners who contend that 
their famous marks have been diluted have faced uphi ll battles. The courts that ha\"e 
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interpreted the FlDA have found thaI it prohibits both dilution by "blurring" and 
"tarnishment ... lso 
When trademark owners have sought relief, demonstrating the exiSTence of tamishment 
the courts have not hesitated to afford plaintiffs relief under the act. lSi When trademark 
owner:s have not been able to show tarnishmenl, however, and have attempted, instead to 
establish that marks on non-competing goods are likely to cause blurring, thev have had 
less success to date. II I • 
Tamishment 
The fir.>t tamishment case decided under the FTOA V.lIS Hasbro Inc. v. Internet En - G '" . fertamme.nJ roup. Hasbro, the maker of the children's board game "Candvland," 
brought acho~ .against the ~~~dants for use of the name "Candyland:' to i d~'ntify a ~xua.1ly e"pllclt Internet site. Hasbro claimed that its mark ..... as associated v.ith . 
lOnocence ~d wbole~mene.ss and would be "irreparably harmed" by the defendant's use 
of the mark I.n COnnectlon V.1th a sexually explicit web site. is! The defendant argued that CandYlan~ did not wanan.r. protection as a famous mark nor did the adult-oriented market 
overlap WIth Hasbro's child-oriented markel. Thus, there was no possibility of confusion bel\.~e~ the. :,",,'0 products.l ~ The federal judge agreed with Hasbro and granted a 
preliminary Injunction against the defendant. If? 
A similar case, Toys 'R' US V. Akkaoui, lSI: the coun granted Toys 'R' Us an injunction 
based ~n u.re FTDA. Toys 'R' US sued the defendants for using "Adults 'R' US" in 
COllIleC1l.on WIth an ~ult-ori~nted -web page. The plaintiffs argued that its Toys ' R' Us ~k would be asSOCIated WIth sexual products if the defendants were able to continue 
using the toy company's mark. U9 11te COwt found that Toys 'R' Us was famous enough 
10 warrant FTDA protection, and granted a preliminary in,'unction against the 
defendants. 16IO 
Blurring 
The. outcomes of blurring cases have been less predictable than those categorized as 
tamishment cases. For example, Sunbeam Producrs, Inc. "1'. West Bend CO.161 
addressed the fact that the defendant was marketing a stand mixer that looked verY similar 
to the S.land mixer Sunbeam marbted and that Sunbeam was the first and only ~ompany 
to contmuously use, promote and sell a stand mixer that looked as this one did.l61 The 
COM found that Sunbeam must establish ,·that it is the owner of a famous mark 
trademark, that West Bend's use of its stand mixer configuration (affixed with) the West 
Bend mark applied. thereto commenced after Sunbeam' s marie became famous and tbat 
such use by West Bend cause(d] di lution of the distinctive quality of Sunbeam 's famous 
marks."16l The court found that the trade dress of Sunbeam's sland mixer was famous, 
and that su~~ trade dress "WD$ diluted by the defendant, therefore an injunction was 
granted agatnst the defendant. I~ 
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. San Francisco 415 Co.,'" the court also granted an injunction 
based on trade dress as the defendant was manufacturing j eans with stitching similar to 
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the famous stitching on jeans manufactured by Levi Strauss & Co. 
In a blurring case of a different nature OO""-e ... er, an injunction '.vas not granted as the 
coure determined that the issues raised in this cases invoked FiIst Amendment concerns. 
In Dr. &uss Emerprises v. Penguin Books USA, lnc.,lIA the plaintiff sued .the defe~t 
for publishing a parody of The Cat and ,he Hal based on the OJ . Slm~n !ria.I. 
Penguin claimed it could use the mark., as parody was protected by the exception m the 
F1UA that permits "non-commercial use of a mark. .. 1~1 The court held that the " F~t 
Amendment would aoply to this usc of the trademarks at issue and that as an expresSive 
use, this use is exemPt from the reach of the Fedeml TradelIl'al'k Dilution ACt."l61 
Similarly, in Elvis Presley Enlerprises v. Captce ,l6f th~ trial court fount1'that ~nj~ctive 
relief could not be granted to the plaintiff. While the court did not expressly dlsrtUss the 
use of the name ofa restaurant, "The Velvet Ehis," as a parody, it did compare the facts 
of the case to Harmel Foods Corp. v. Jim Hel1Sen Products, Inc.l1U where by the cOwt 
held that "parodies do little to diminish the mental connection already formed between 
a plaintiff's mark and its prodUCL .. m The Fifth Circuit Coun of A~S. recently 
reversed Captce, resting its judgement solely on a traditional trademark infringement 
analysis. In 
While the courts have easily decided cases involving dilution by blurring in instances of 
trade dress and parody, they have had more difficulty in deciding upon cases invoh'ing 
marks of varying degrees of fame when issues of trade dress and parody are not 
present. III 
Thus far courts that have applied the FTDA to blurring claims not in\'Olving parody or 
trade ~ have adopted the six·factor blurring test set oUt in Mead [)a,om to detennine 
if di lution exists. In Mead Data, Judge Sweet identified six factOrs as relevant to tilt 
di lution--by. bluning inquiry: (1) similarity of the marks, (2) the s imilarity o,f the products 
covered bv the marks, (3) the sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory lDtcnt. (5) the 
renown of the senior mark, and (6) the renov.n of the junior mark.17S One problem in 
using the "Mead Data test" in connection v.ith the FTOA is, according to Ihe act's 
express language, the plaintiff need not prove a "likelihood of confusion" as .one does in 
traditional trademark infringement disputes. Moreo ... er, the Mead Data test IS much too 
similar to the test common1y used to detcnnine the likelihood of confusion in a traditional 
trademark infringement suit. 
In a traditional trademark suit, for instance. the ultimate issue is generally .... 1lether the 
defendant's conduct creates a likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinary 
consumers .... ,ould be mislead or confused as to the source, affiliation or sponsorship of 
8. good or service. In Jardache Enterprises l'. Hogg IVyld,l'l. for i~tance , the tenth circuit 
identified four factors to determine likelihood. of confusion, applYIng the concepts found 
in the Mead Data test: (1) relatedness of the goods, (2) similarity of the marks, (3) 
l!kely ~S!C.;...of purchaser care, and (4) the defendant 's intent in ~l.ecti~g the m~.111 
While the remaining two factors in the Mead Data test do not tle"'m VIIth the typtcal 
Iikelihood.of..confusion analysis, they also do not tie·in with the intent of the F1UA to 
protect famous marks, regardless of the fame ofa junior mark. The "renown of the junior 
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mark" factor generally favors the defendant in 11 dilution case, as il affords a level of 
protec~ion to lesser knov.n marks., even if such a mark is, effectively, diluting the famous 
mark .m sorn:e manne~. The theory underlying this faclor is that a lin1~known jwt.ior 
mark 15 not likely to dilute the famous mark on a recognizable level. Typically, a junior 
~k that is not well known or that has just entered the market .... ill be protected wxler 
this factor, as the junior mark will almost never be deemed famous. III 
Despite the recognized theoretical difference between lilcelihood of confusion and dilution 
by b~urring. ~crc. has been little difference in practice because the presently accepted 
blumng ana hkelihood of confusions tests are so similar. 
Despite the similarities of both tests, there exists yet another apparent inconsistency 
betwe~n the ,\.fead Data test and the FTDA, which expressly stales that dilution is the 
lesserung of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services., regardless of 
the presence or absence of competition between the famous mark and other parties.11!l 
The ~feod Dora test, however, considers the similarity of the products in detennining 
bl~g. 11 is arguably inconsistent for the FTOA to e liminate competition bet\o\."een 
pa.ru~s as a rae.tor whil~ the couns continue to consider similarity of the products as a 
blumng factor In applYIng the FTDA. Nonetheless, courts applying the Mead Data test 
have not acknowledged the inconsistency. Rather, they have explained the similaritv 
factor as being imPOI1ant in this type of blurring analysis because "if the products sold 
under the marks in dispute are alike, there is greater likelihood that blurring will occur 
in the mind of the consumer."110 
~I ~s from the trend that courts will continue to consider the Mead Da,a test, and 
ns ~erent reliance em the similarity and fame of all parties brought fonh in a case, as 
an Important factor in detenninin~ the likelihood of dilution by blmring when parody or 
trade dress are not present factors m a case. 'This fact, \\-ill continue to pose a substantial 
chaileIlge to trademark o~ers attempting to stop the unauthorized use of their mark. 
For example, in Ringling Bros. v. B.E. Windows1' 1 and Ringling Bros. v. Utah Divition 
0f. Tr~1 Deveiopment,11'1. the courts refused to grant injunctions against the defendants. 
RinglIng Bros. sought to enjoin B.E. Windows from using "The Greatest Bar on Earth" 
to describe a bar atop the World Tnlde Center.11l Similarly, they attempted to enjoin 
U~ from using "1be Greatest Snow on Earth .. to promote its ski industry. I'" In H.E 
WIndows, the co~. held that this WII..5 not a case of blurring as "Ringling's trademark is 
a common descnpuve phrase, rather than a single distinctive word." and that the use by 
the defendant was not v.idely recognized, and thus could not be construed as a famous 
use.1I5 Similarly. in the Utah Dil'ision ofTravtl Del'. case, the court ruled that the use 
of the slogan was not famous as it was not ..... idel}' recognized outside of Utah. l16 
HO .... "e\'el'. in I'!'ermatic, inc. v. Toeppen ll1 and Panavis ion international LP. l'. Toeppen , 
both Intermatlc, Inc. and Panavision International L.P.IP were described 11..5 "famous 
marks" and, thus, were given dilution protection. "' Once these two marks were 
de:e~ed f~ous, no provisions were applied to determine if the mark Toeppeo was 
IlSmg tn each lIlStance were considered famous. 
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1be Failure of the FTDA to Preempt State La .... 'S 
Finally, the fact that the federal statule is not intended to preempt state la",'S works against 
the strength of the FTDA. The nDA is expressly designed to augment the state laws, 
nOI preempt them. l90 This, however, does not seem to coincide with the Lanham Act's 
desire for unifonnit)' . Prior to the passage of the new legislation, the L~ Act 
preempted the field of unfair competition in all ~ it addressed. The. ~X1stence of 
state and federal st8ULtes only makes logical sense If state statues are limited to those 
activities that are solely intrastate in accordance .... ith the Commerce Clause. However, 
it seems unlikely that a famous mark would ever exist as sMely intrastate given the broad 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause b)' the cou.$. 
The FTDA was designed to rule concurrently .... ith state laws to allow plaintiff's to seek 
the best dilution remedy available to them. Therefore, in stateS where dilution law is 
more specifi c or imposes harsher penalties upon those guilt)' of dilution, a plaintiff could 
sue under the more developed state law without fear that the lesser developed FTDA 
would preempt their action. 
However, two potentially hannful effects to the intent of the FTDA arise ~ue to 
concurrence of state and federal law in addressing di lution. First, national compames are 
still able to bring a claim to any state court. Therefore, fonan shopping for the best legal 
outcome has oot been eliminated, as was one intent of the FTDA. Second, to guarantee 
a national injunction against the defendant in the event of the plaintiff's victory, the 
plaintiff must rely upon the decision of the federal court to reconcile and apply both state 
and federal law in cases brought before it. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot rely upon the 
more developed state statutes to protect them against dilution on a national basis ~~ss 
courtS consistently apply 5tate and federal di lution statutes concurrently. Plamtiffs 
effeeti"'ely risk exchanging more developed law for greater protection. Th.i~ risk. mi~ 
be justifiable if the federal courts were accurately and consistently applymg . di lUlJon 
standards and definitions, instead of infringement standards, thus SUggestlD& that 
concurrent application of state and federal law might also be consistent 
CONCLUSIONS Al.'TI SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION 
The existence of the weaknesses discussed above, despite the evident strengths of the 
FTOA, have contributed greatly to the: ineffectiveness of the: FTDA in fully realizing its 
intent. It has been ineffeeti\'C in completely proteCting truly famous marks. 191 Cowts 
have begun using tests similar to those used in infringement cases, making ~ FTDA no 
more than an extended infringement provision in many ca5es.1t1 Addltlonally, the 
continued lack: of clarification of the defmition of dilution in the FTDA perpetuales 
problems experienced due to the similar lack of a consistent and worka~le definition 
under state laws. The fimdarnental dichotomy betv,'eC(l the expressed lDtent of tbt 
Lanham Act and the FIDA also presents problems ..... ith the future of dilution theory in 
the court system. 
- ..... -~--
As a result of these weaknesses, the intent of the FTDA to act as an instrument to !mite 
the state laws and decrease forum shopping is failing. Many of the cases argued undtr 
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th~ f!DA ~ave ?een ..... ithin the jurisdictions of the district couns or U.S. appellate courts 
..... 'thin CalifOrnia, New York, Illinois, Michigan, New Jef'SCY, and Ohio, where the 
strongest and most developed state laws concerning dilution exist. 
The FTDA "''9.S designed to protect ·'famous" marks from dilution. Nowhere in its 
legislative ~ory d!d it limit such protection based upon the fame of the junior mark. 
If the FTDA 15 to bve up to its legislative intent, then courts should be protecting the 
famous~, regardless ofthc fame attributed to the junior mark.. Therefore, the courts 
should e~~e ~e use . of a famous mark test on the jurrior mark and grant the senior 
~I~er an lDJunctIOn agmnst the "Cree ride" the j unior mark enjoys when using a mark 
sundar to that of a famous senior mark.. 19J 
lRere exists a great need to change the judicial trend associated with the FTDA. As 
great~ reliance is placed upon dilution provisions due to the growing number oflntemet 
domam name cases, many of which solely rely upon di lution to prevent the unauthorized. 
use ?f a trademark as a domain name for a Web si te entirely unrelated 10 the good or 
service related to the mark, the FTDA will become the primary vehicle used to support 
such action. I~ 
~e further definition of a "'famous" mark may also be necessary to remain congruent 
;-'lth both the T~~emark Law Revision Act of 1988 and GAIT. Originally, the FTDA 
md~d a pro:,:slon that ~~~ a "famo~ mark" to be registered on the Principal 
RegLSter. AddillO~.lly, anb-dllutlon protectIon of unn:gistered marks is a move away 
from a .stated goallJl the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 to encourage the use of, 
and reliance on the fedCI1i11 ttademark registration system. I" The Clinton administration, 
among others, expressed the concern that a forma l registration of a mark would be 
conu:ary to U.S. efforts:o "persuade fore ign governments to loosen overly fonnalistic 
reqwrements for protection of intellectual property. " 11Il However, the failure to include 
a. ~r definition of "dilution" or " famous mark, n along with the use of ill-considered 
dilutIon tests may be more baImfuI in attnlcting foreitD companies wishing to do business 
in the: United States. 
~e co~ need ~ develop a new deflDition for "famous." To more uniformJy detennine 
~ous staws, It would ~ prudent to require a mark to be registered on the Principal 
Re~ster, ~ was propose~ I~ ~ FTDA's original form. Great latitude shouJd be given 
to famous maries as. p~tl~ lJI sucb cases. If the true intent of the FDTA is to protect 
famous marks from dlluUOn m order to protect the holder's investment in the marks then 
fam~us marks ~uld be protected from any type of dilution, whether it be blurri~ or 
~hment, WIthout regard to the renown of the junior mark, or the similarity of the 
Junior mark or the producr it represents to the senior mark and its product. Either 
stronger language needs to be added to the FTDA or the courts need to consider the 
legislati"'e intent of the act in interpreting its goals and purpose. Thus far, rru1y famous 
marks have often suffered uphill battles against maID of lesser fame and renown 
Es~ntial1y, the immense fame of the "famous mark" has hindered its course of actio~ 
ag~nst. smaller, less famous marks--a result directly opposed to the intent of the 
leglslanon to protect famous marks from such gradual whittling away of the famous 
mark's value. 
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Since many couns seem 10 be skeptical of dilution by blurring theory without the 
existence of trade dress or parody, evidence of actual dilution might tip the scales of 
justice in the famous mark's favor in such instances. For example, the trademark owner 
might decide to condUCI a survey to establish empirical data in suppon of blurring. The 
survey might include a measure of the strength of the mark being blUlTtd. Fo~lowing 
such a measure, tbe survey ""ould ask respondents to answer if they recogrnu any 
product or name given in a list of products and names similar to ~t of th~ famous ~k 
The junior mark accused DC diluting the famous mark .... -ould be Included tn such 8 list to 
detenninc if such a junior mark has any diluting effect based upon consumer recognition, I 
Cowts could usc such data to detennine the extent of a jtmior mark's dilution affect 
While conducting such a survey 'would be no simple task. as de\'cloping 8 representative 
and non-biased survey and consumer pool is difficult. such empiri!!aJ. data might be I 
useful. 
A plaintiff might also want to stress to the court that, if the defendant prevails, the 
occurrence of dilution will only be encouraged, as others will fee l free to use the 
plaintiffs mark. The fact that one defendant may not singuJarly cause dilution may be 
enough not to legally enjoin him from such unauthorized usc. As explained by Professor 
J. Tbomas McCarthy, however, "the defendant will argue that its use is 50 small and 
insignificant in comparison to the power and strength of a famous mark that any injury 
to the capacity of the mark to remain strong is unimportant and de minimis. 1be theory 
of dilution by blurring is that if one small user can blur the sharp focus of the famous 
marX 10 uniquely signify one source, than another and another small user can and .... ill do 
so._[tbereforel, significant injury is caused by the cwnulative effect."]" Foresight by the 
courts to envision the cumulative effect of many "singularly insignificant" defendants 
would be a significant step towards eliminating dilution efforts due to blurring. 
The cumnt trend of decisions has also made it clear that essential to the plaintiffs case 
is the development of evidence supporting predatory intent on the part of the defendant. 
However, deyelopment of such evidence sbouJd only be relevant in detennining damages 
within a case brought about under the FTDA. Owners of "famous marks" should be 
afforded the protection of a preliminary injunction from the court .... ithout the ne:d .to 
prove predatory inlenL In arguing for the awarding of damages. however, the platntlff 
should attempt to prove that the junior mark or product was acting outside of the 
botmdaries of the First Amendment and was attempting to dilute by tarnishment, 
disparaging the name or certain qualities associated with ilS product. This could be done 
by establishing a fJK]tive for the junior mark' s behavior, by demonstrating the manner in 
which the junior product or service was marketed, or by establishing that the intent of the 
junior mark was to use the fame of the senior mark to gain notoriety, to name a few. 
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102. The amendment to the Lanham Act which constitutes the FTDA is u follows: 
Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is amended by adding 
at thr: end the following new subsection: Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks 
(c) (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled to the principles of equiry 
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against 
another person's conunercial use in conunerce of a mark or trade name, if such 
use begins after the make has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is pro .. ided in 
this subsection. In detennining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a COW1 
may consider factol'$ such as. but not limited to--{a) the degree of inherent or 
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (b) the duration and extent of the use ofw 
mark in connection "'ith the goods or services "'ith which the mark is used; (c) 
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (d) the 
geographical elCten,t of the trading area in which the mark is used; (e) the channels 
of tradr: for the goods or services with which the oVo'T\er 's mark is used; (f) the 
degree of ret:ognition of the mark in trading areas and channels of trade used by 
the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (g) tbt: 
na~ and extent of use of the same or similar mark by third parties; and (h) 
whether the mark was registered wtder the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of 
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. In an action brought WIder this 
subsection. the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only 10 injunctive relicf 
-'unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade 
on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution oflhe famous mark. If such willful 
intent is proven., the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the 
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remedies set fonh in sections 35 (a) and 36, subject to the discretion of the court 
and the principles of equit)'. The ownership by a person of a valid registration 
~e~ the A~ of March 3. 1881 or the Act of February 20, 1905 or on the 
pnnclpai regIster shall be. a complete bar to an aClion against that person, with 
rtspec1 to that mark, that IS brought by another person under the common law or 
a statute of a slate and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a 
mark, label, or form of advertisement. The following shall not be actionable 
under thi~ section:. ~air use of a famous mad: by another person in comparative 
commercial advertISing or promotion to identify the competing goods or services 
of the owner of the famous mark; noncommercial use of the mark' all forms of 
Dews reporting and news commentary. Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 
(15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by inserting after the paragraph defining when a 
mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" the follo .... ing: "The. tenn ' dilution' 
means the le~ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish 
goods or semces. regardless of the presence or absence of competition between 
the owner of a famous mark and other parties. or likelihood of confusion mistake 
or deception." This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 
on the date of enactment of this Act 
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